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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey focuses on several legislative developments. The 76th
Texas Legislature adopted many bills affecting the banking indus-
try, including the adoption of interstate branching legislation.1
This Survey also covers certain cases affecting the banking industry
that involve legislation adopted in the 1997 Texas legislative session. The
75th Texas Legislature adopted, and voters approved in 1997, the most
significant changes to the Texas homestead law2 since enactment of the
state's first Constitution and simultaneously joined every other state in
* Shareholder, Winstead Sechrest & Minick P.C.; J.D., University of Nebraska, with
Distinction. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his colleagues, Daniel B.
Gail and Jennifer Knapek.
1. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
2. Texas laws protecting the homestead are expansive and deeply rooted. Homestead
rights trace back to Texas' days as a republic, prior to admission into the Union. See Act
approved Jan. 26, 1839, 3rd Cong. R.S., § 1, 1839 Repub. Tex. Laws 1236, reprinted in 2
H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 125-26 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1889).
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allowing homeowners to borrow against the equity build-up in their resi-
dences. 3 Texas House Joint Resolution 31 (the Amendment) amended
section 50, article 16 of the Texas Constitution to broaden the types of
liens that validly may be secured by "homestead" property. The Amend-
ment added two new categories of authorized liens on the homestead-
home equity loans and reverse mortgages-and made changes relating to
the authorized lien on homesteads for home improvement loans. Litiga-
tion has arisen regarding the construction of these provisions, including
the decisions discussed herein.
II. LEGISLATION
A. INTERSTATE BRANCHING
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
19944 (the Riegle-Neal Act or the IBBEA) established certain basic prin-
ciples regarding the interstate activities of banks and bank holding com-
panies. Beginning June 1, 1997, banks with different home states could
merge or consolidate on an interstate basis. 5 States, however, had the
ability to prohibit interstate mergers involving banks they had chartered,
or national banks having their main office in the state, by enacting legisla-
tion before June 1, 1997 that prohibited merger transactions involving
out-of-state banks. 6 This is commonly referred to as "opt-out"
legislation.
In 1995, Governor George W. Bush signed into law a bill in which
Texas elected to opt-out of interstate branching. 7 An issue arose regard-
ing a deficiency in Texas' opt-out law. Congress had required states opt-
ing-out of the Riegle-Neal Act to apply legislation uniformly to all
banks.8 Banks, as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, include
state savings banks.9 The Texas law, however, excluded from its coverage
state savings banks.' 0 A state savings bank could merge and branch
across Texas state lines, unlike any other state-chartered bank."'
The issue regarding the flaw in the opt-out law arose when Nation-
sBank, N.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, sought to merge with its affiliate,
NationsBank of Texas, N.A., based in Dallas. The Office of the Comp-
3. House Joint Resolution 31 (H.J.R. 31) amending the Texas Constitution was
presented to the voters as Proposition 8 on the November 4, 1997 ballot.
4. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (1994)) [hereinafter IBBEA].
5. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 44 (1994), 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(I) (1994)
[hereinafter FDIA].
6. See FDIA § 44(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(2)(A).
7. See Act of Sept. 1, 1997 75th Leg., ch. 1008, § 1. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.
§ 32.0095 (Vernon 1998) (repealed 1999) (formerly codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 489f). Only two states, Texas and Montana, opted-out.
8. See FDIA § 44(a)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(2)(A).
9. See FDIA §§ 3(a)(1) and (2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(a)(1) and (2).
10. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a)(50) (Vernon 1998) (repealed 1998).
11. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. ch. 92, subchapters H and I (Vernon 1998) (providing
for the merger or consolidation of a Texas savings bank with a foreign savings bank).
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troller of the Currency (OCC) not only approved the merger, but raised
the deficiency with the Texas opt-out law in the process.12
The commissioner of the Texas Department of Banking (the Depart-
ment) entered federal district court to challenge the OCC's decision and
to obtain an injunction blocking the merger. In Ghiglieri v. NationsBank
of Texas,13 Judge Jorge Solis agreed with NationsBank and denied the
injunction. A week later on May 13, 1998, after consulting with the gov-
ernor and legislative leaders, the Commissioner announced that her office
would accept applications for interstate merger and branching transac-
tions for all state-chartered banks.14
With the arrival of interstate branching, the commissioner set up a task
force to examine what structure the state's law should take. The goals
were to review and recommend laws: (1) to ensure that a Texas state
bank charter is a modern and competitive charter; and (2) to ensure that
Texas is viewed as a favorable state in which to locate or relocate a bank's
headquarters. House Bill 2066 incorporated the Task Force's recommen-
dations. Among the key provisions are the following:
Registration to do Business. An out-of-state financial institution is re-
quired to register with the Texas Secretary of State prior to operating a
branch or other office in Texas by complying with the Texas requirements
relating to foreign corporations doing business in Texas.15 This is a
broader requirement than existed under prior law1 6 in that it applies to all
out-of-state financial institutions (e.g., savings associations, savings banks,
credit unions, and trust companies), not just banks. An interstate branch
or other office of an out-of-state financial institution that existed in Texas
on September 1, 1999 must register before January 1, 2000.
Appointment of Agent to Receive Service of Process. The legislation
provides for an optional designation of a registered agent by a Texas state
bank or other Texas financial institution. 7
De Novo Branching by Texas State Banks. A Texas state bank, with the
Commissioner's prior approval, may establish and maintain a new branch
12. See Decision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application
to Merge Nationsbank of Texas, National Association of Dallas, Texas, with and into Na-
tionsbank, National Association, Charlotte, North Carolina, OCC Corporate Decision No.
98-19, Apr. 2, 1998.
13. No. 3:97-CV-2897-P, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6637 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 1998). The
court, however, did not specifically address the viability of Texas' opt-out law.
14. See Texas Department of Banking Press Release (last modified May 13, 1998),
<http://www.banking.state.tx.us/exec/press47.html/>; see also, Texas Department of Bank-
ing Opinion No. 98-27 (last modified July 30, 1998) (recognizing formally the fatal flaw)
<http://www.banking.state.tx.us/legal/opinions/98%2D27.html>.
15. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 201.102 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
16. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 39.003, 59.001 (Vernon 1998) (requiring a designated
agent for service of process for foreign banks and registering the office of an out-of-state
bank).
17. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 201.103(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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(referred to as a de novo branch' 8) or acquire a branch in a state other
than Texas. 19 Of course, the other state must permit the same.
Entry by De Novo Branching on a Reciprocal Basis. An out-of-state
bank can establish a de novo branch in Texas if, among other things, the
laws of the home state of the out-of-state bank would permit a Texas
bank to establish and maintain a de novo branch in that state.20
Deposit Cap. An interstate merger of banks is not permitted in Texas
if, upon "consummation of the transaction, the resulting bank, including
all depository institution affiliates of the resulting bank, would control
20% or more of the total amount of deposits held by all depository insti-
tutions" in Texas.21 Prior Texas law2 2 established a similar 20% limit on
market share.
Age Law. Other than the de novo branching discussed above, an out-
of-state bank is not permitted to acquire a Texas bank in an interstate
merger transaction unless the Texas bank has been in continuous opera-
tion for a period of five years as of the date the interstate merger be-
comes effective. 23
Super Wildcard. The legislation includes a "super wildcard" or "super
parity" provision.24 The provision generally authorizes a Texas state
bank to perform an act, own property, or offer a product or service that is
at the time permissible within the United States for a depository institu-
tion organized under federal or state law subject to the same limitations
and restrictions as are applicable to the other depository institution. Cer-
tain conditions or restrictions apply to this authority. A state bank that
intends to exercise a power that is not otherwise authorized for state
banks under Texas law must submit a letter to the Commissioner prior to
exercising the power.25 The bank may start to use the proposed power
after the thirtieth day following the date the Commissioner receives the
bank's letter, unless the Commissioner designates an earlier date or for-
bids the activity. The Commissioner may prohibit a bank from exercising
a power if it would adversely affect the safety and soundness of the bank.
Also, the super wildcard provision may not be used by a Texas state bank
18. A "de novo branch" is defined as "a branch of a bank located in a host state that:
(A) is originally established by the bank as a branch; and (B) does not become a branch of
the bank as a result of: (i) the acquisition of another bank or branch of another bank; or
(ii) the merger or conversion involving [any such] ... bank or branch." TEX. FIN. CODE
ANN. § 201.002(a)(12) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
19. See id. § 203.001.
20. See id. § 203.002.
21. Id. § 203.004.
22. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 1998) (repealed by Acts 1999, 76th
Leg., ch. 344, § 9.002(3)).
23. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 203.005 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
24. See id. § 32.010(a).
25. See id. § 32.010(b).
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to alter or negate the application of Texas laws with respect to the
following:
(1) establishment and maintenance of a branch in this state or an-
other state or country;
(2) sale of insurance products and services in this state;
(3) permissible interest rates and loan fees chargeable in this state;
(4) fiduciary duties owed to a client or customer by the bank in its
capacity as fiduciary in this state;
(5) consumer protection laws applicable to transactions in this state;
or
(6) real estate development, marketing, and sales activities in this
state.26
Discovery of Customer Records. The provision regarding discovery of
bank records is returned to the Texas Finance Code from the Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code.27 The same section of the Texas Finance Code
also governs the discovery of client records maintained by a trust
institution.
Attachment, Injunction, Execution, or Garnishment. A claim against a
customer of a financial institution must now be delivered or served at the
address designated as the address of the registered agent of the financial
institution.2 8 If a financial institution files a registration statement with
the Texas Secretary of State, a claim is not effective as to the financial
institution if the claim is served or delivered to an address other than the
designated address of the financial institution's registered agent. 29 This
statute is designed to address two main concerns: (1) from the standpoint
of an interstate financial institution, the practical problems that ensue if
all kinds of claims against customers are served or delivered to all offices
of its organization in Texas, and (2) from the standpoint of claimants, the
difficulty of knowing where and how to serve or deliver a claim to an
interstate financial institution.
Public Deposits. With the arrival of interstate branching, questions
arose as to whether an interstate branch in Texas could hold public de-
posits given that certain authorizing statutes required funds be deposited
with a bank "domiciled" or "located" in Texas. To address these ques-
tions, the Texas Financial Code provides that a legally operating inter-
state branch in Texas is considered to be in, within, located in, authorized
to do business in, domiciled in, and chartered in this state.30 Various sec-
tions of the Education Code, Government Code, Local Government
Code, Natural Resources Code, Transportation Code, and Probate Code
were also amended to authorize, among other things, public entities to
26. See id. § 32.010(a).
27. See id. § 59.006.
28. See TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. § 59.008(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
29. See id. § 59.008(b).
30. See id. § 201.004(c).
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place public funds with a bank that-has its main office or a branch office
in Texas.
Multistate Trust Provisions. House Bill 2066 also amended the Texas
Trust Company Act by adding a chapter 9,31 which, among other things,
provides that an out-of-state trust company that establishes or maintains
an office in Texas may conduct any activity at the office that would be
authorized for a state trust company to conduct at its office.
Law Applicable to Deposit Contracts. Two provisions were enacted es-
tablishing that Texas law governs a deposit contract between a bank and a
customer account holder if the branch or separate office of the bank that
accepts the deposit contract is located in Texas.32
Sale of Trust Department-Succession of Trust Powers. The Texas Fi-
nance Code was amended to provide that in the sale of certain activities
at a branch or other office a successor or purchasing financial institution
with sufficient fiduciary authority may continue the office, trust, or fiduci-
ary relationship without certain judicial action and without regard to cer-
tain other qualifications. 33 Section 59.004 now reads as follows:
(a) If, at the time of a merger, reorganization, conversion, sale of
substantially all of its assets under Chapter 32 or other applicable
law, or sale of substantially all of its trust accounts and related activi-
ties at a separate branch or other office, a reorganizing or selling
financial institution is acting as trustee, guardian, executor, or admin-
istrator, or in another fiduciary capacity, a successor or purchasing
financial institution with sufficient fiduciary authority may continue
the office, trust, or fiduciary relationship:
(1) without the necessity of judicial action or action by the creator
of the office, trust, or fiduciary relationship; and
(2) without regard to whether the successor or purchasing finan-
cial institution meets qualification requirements specified in an in-
strument creating the office, trust, or fiduciary relationship other
than a requirement related to geographic locale of account admin-
istration, including requirements as to jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion, location of principal office, or type of financial institution.34
Notice of Subsequent Event. Section 201.00835 requires each out-of-
state state bank that has established and maintains an interstate branch in
Texas to give written notice to the Commissioner within a prescribed pe-
riod of time (generally, thirty days) before a merger or other transaction
that would cause a change of control with respect to the bank or a bank
holding company that controls the bank, if an application is required to
be filed with the bank's home state regulator or a federal bank supervi-
31. See id. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 182.020 (referencing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 342a-9.001-9.306).
32. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 201.004 and 34.301(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
33. See id. § 59.004.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 201.008.
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sory agency, including an application filed pursuant to the Change in
Bank Control Act 36 or the Bank Holding Company Act. 37
Agency Activities. The authority for state banks to act as agent for
other financial institutions has been expanded. 38 Previously, a state bank
could act as agent for a depository institution affiliate. The current stat-
ute removes the "affiliate" requirement and, therefore, a state bank can
act as agent for unaffiliated depository institutions.
Appointment and Service of Foreign Bank and Trust Company in Fidu-
ciary Capacity. The legislation amended section 105A of the Texas Pro-
bate Code to set forth provisions for a corporate fiduciary that does not
have its main office or a branch office in Texas (referred to as "foreign
corporate fiduciaries"). 39 Foreign corporate fiduciaries, having the cor-
porate power to so act, may be appointed and may serve in Texas
as trustee (whether of a personal or corporate trust), executor, ad-
ministrator, guardian of the estate, or in any other fiduciary capacity,
whether the appointment be by will, deed, agreement, declaration,
indenture, court order or decree, or otherwise, when and to the ex-
tent that the home state of the corporate fiduciary grants authority to
serve in like fiduciary capacity to a corporate fiduciary whose home
state is [Texas]. 40
Before qualifying or serving in Texas in any fiduciary capacity, the statute
sets forth certain conditions for a foreign corporate fiduciary.
B. BANK FRANCHISE TAXES
Texas franchise law had treated banks differently than other corpora-
tions. For banks, interest and dividend income had been allocated to the
state of the bank's headquarters. (Thus, banks whose only presence in
Texas was through branches would return all their interest and dividend
income to their "home state," where their headquarters were located.)
For corporations other than banks, interest and dividends are allocated to
the state where the payor is located. In House Bill 2067, the Texas Legis-
lature adopted an approach in which all banks are subject to Texas
franchise taxes to the same extent as other corporations doing business in
Texas.4 1
C. REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR COMMERCIAL ACCOUNTS
House Bill 2800 amended the Texas Finance Code to protect holders of
dishonored business checks and to clarify a financial institution's right to
disclose information to such a holder.42 Financial institutions are required
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (Supp. 1999).
37. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (1999).
38. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 59.005 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
39. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 105A (Vernon Supp. 2000).
40. Id.
41. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
42. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 277.001-277.003 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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to maintain certain information from business checking account holders43
and must request that the account holder notify the financial institution
of changes annually. 44 The information includes a corporation's certifi-
cate of incorporation and assumed name certificate and certain informa-
tion regarding the business owner of a sole proprietorship. The financial
institution is protected when disclosing this information to persons who
hold returned or dishonored checks and who make a proper request for
information, and it may charge a fee for providing such information. 45
D. OMNIBUS FINANCE CODE CODIFICATION
Texas Senate Bill 1368 made nonsubstantive corrections to existing
codes and new codes enacted by the 75th Legislature. The bill includes:
(1) the codification of the Texas Trust Company Act into the new title 3,
subtitle F of the Texas Finance Code;46 and (2) the codification of the
Texas Credit Title into Title 4 Subtitle A of the Texas Finance Code. 47
House Bill 10, the Texas Finance Code, and House Bill 1971, the Texas
Credit Title, both took effect September 1, 1997 and created consterna-
tion for practitioners trying to find the applicable law and the proper
manner to cite the same. Since the codification of the Texas Credit Title
into the Texas Finance Code, the provisions should be easier to find and
document.
E. REVOLVING CREDIT ACCOUNTS
House Bill 744 amended the Texas Finance Code to permit a revolving
credit account that draws interest at a rate of up to 18% per year regard-
less of the account's balance, 48 and to authorize various fees.49 The au-
thorized fees include: (1) annual fees; (2) late charges; (3) cash advance
charges; (4) returned check fees; and (5) fees for exceeding a credit limit.
No interest on these fees is permitted. 50
Each customer's monthly statement must contain the following notice
in at least 10-point type that is conspicuously set out: "A LATE
CHARGE OF FIVE PERCENT OF THE PAYMENT DUE OR A
MAXIMUM OF $15 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR A PAYMENT MADE
10 DAYS OR MORE AFTER THE DATE PAYMENT OF THIS BILL
IS DUE."'51
Additionally, a delinquency charge may be imposed, not to exceed $15
(up from $10) under a retail charge agreement. 52 In the event such a
43. See id. § 277.002(a).
44. See id. § 277.002(b).
45. See id. § 277.003(c).
46. See id. 88 181.001-199.005.
47. See id. §§ 301.001-339.005.
48. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 346.101(a).
49. See, e.g., id. § 346.103(a).
50. See id. § 346.103(c).
51. Id. § 346.103(c).
52. See id. § 345.157(b).
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charge is imposed, a customer's monthly statement must also contain the
following notice in at least 10-point type that is conspicuously set out: "A
DELINQUENCY CHARGE OF $15 MAY BE ASSESSED FOR A
PAYMENT THAT IS IN DEFAULT FOR A PERIOD THAT IS
LONGER THAN 21 DAYS."'53 The legislation requires a holder to send
fifty cents of each delinquency charge collected, in excess of $10, to the
Comptroller of Public Accounts.54
F. DOCUMENTARY FEE IN RETAIL VEHICLE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
House Bill 1510 provides that the documentary fee included in a vehi-
cle retail installment contract shall not exceed either $50 or a reasonable
amount that both parties agreed to, and the contract must contain specific
notice language regarding such fee.55
G. ADDITIONAL INTEREST FOR DEFAULT ON A SIMPLE INTEREST
LOAN CONTRACT
House Bill 2337 amended the Texas Credit Title and the Texas Finance
Code to permit default interest on loan contracts bearing simple interest
as had been the case on loan contracts with precomputed interest (which
may not exceed fifty-four cents for each dollar of scheduled
installment) .56
H. CHARGES FOR LOAN ADMINISTRATION AND APPLICATIONS
House Bill 2338 amended the Texas Credit Title and the Texas Finance
Code to permit administrative fees for loan contracts, not to exceed $25
for a loan of more than $1,000 or up to $20 for a loan of $1,000 or less.57
Fifty cents of each such fee shall be deposited with the Comptroller of
Public Accounts.
I. QUALIFIED COMMERCIAL LOAN
House Bill 2781 amended the Texas Credit Title and the Texas Finance
Code to clarify the definition of "qualified commercial loan" to clearly
include committed revolving lines of credit (whether or not advanced)
and syndicated transactions. 58 In addition, Texas Senate Bill 172
amended the Texas Credit Title and the Texas Finance Code to change
the definition of "qualified commercial loan" to be a commercial loan of:
(1) $3 million or more if secured by real property, and (2) $250,000 or
more if not secured by real property, and, if less than $500,000, requiring
written verification .from the borrower that he has been advised to seek
and had the opportunity to seek legal advice and accounting advice in
53. Id. § 345.157(e).
54. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 345.157(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
55. See id. § 348.006(c).
56. See id. §§ 342.203 and 342.206.
57. See id. §§ 342.201(e), 342.308(a)(9), 342.502(b).
58. See id. § 306.001(9).
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connection with the loan.59
III. CASE LAW
A. HOME EQUITY LITIGATION
Litigation has arisen pertaining to the construction of the Texas home
equity provisions. As of end of the Survey period, 60 only two trial courts
had issued significant decisions. In both cases the courts concluded that a
lender could require a borrower to use equity loan proceeds to pay debts
to other lenders.6'
The Texas Constitution provides that a lender may not require that the
proceeds of an equity loan be applied to pay other debt, except debt se-
cured by the homestead or debt to another lender.62 Section 50(g) sets
forth a prescribed notice entitled "Notice Concerning Extensions of
Credit." The notice states, in pertinent part, the following:
(Q) LOANS DESCRIBED BY SECTION 50(a)(6), ARTICLE
XVI, OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION MUST:
(1) NOT REQUIRE YOU TO APPLY THE PROCEEDS TO AN-
OTHER DEBT THAT IS NOT SECURED BY YOUR HOME OR
TO ANOTHER DEBT TO THE SAME LENDER. 63
Thus, the notice does not track the language of section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i),
and litigation has followed concerning the proper interpretation.
In Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.,64 the court issued an order dis-
missing the case for failure to state a claim. In this case, the plaintiff
alleged a lender could not require the debtor to use loan proceeds to pay
debts not owed to the lender. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged they
were required to use a portion of the equity loan to pay off debts to other
lenders totaling $106,174.02 and that the defendant improperly required
the payment of debts from the loan proceeds that were not secured by a
lien on the plaintiffs' home. The court ruled that a lender could require a
borrower to pay off other debt to other lenders and stated:
While the constitutional provision at issue is not an example of the
most artfully crafted provision, the Court's reading of the provision
59. See id.
60. One important decision has been rendered after the Survey period. On November
23, 1999, Judge Joe Kendall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas-
Dallas Division, entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in Doody v. Aneriquest
Mortgage Co., No. 3:98-CV-1844-X, 1999 WL 1063424 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 1999), in which
he dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for ripeness. The Judge noted that there was no default
by the plaintiffs under the loan and no effort by the defendant to foreclose its lien. Based
thereon, the court held that the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims did not present a
case of actual controversy and, therefore, the case was not ripe for judicial determination.
An appeal to the Fifth Circuit is pending.
61. In Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., a case decided after the Survey period, the
court also made a similar conclusion holding that the defendant was allowed to require the
borrower to apply the proceeds of the loan to repay debts to other lenders as a condition of
the loan. See Doody & Carrington, 1999 WL 1063424 at *5.
62. See TEx. CoNsTn. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).
63. Id.
64. No. 6:98cv664 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 1998).
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does not find it to be ambiguous. The Court cannot interpret
§ 50(a)(6) to support Plaintiffs' argument, but rather agrees with De-
fendant's interpretation of the provision as having two separate and
distinct exceptions to the general prohibition that a home equity
lender cannot require the debtor to apply the proceeds to another
debt.65
An appeal was made to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit has certified
the issue to the Texas Supreme Court.
In McMahan v. Long Beach Mortgage Co.,6 6 the plaintiff sought,
among other things, forfeiture of principal and interest on an equity loan
based on defendant requiring plaintiffs to apply in excess of $50,000 of
the proceeds from the extension of credit to repay other debts which
were not debts secured by the homestead. Thus, the proper interpreta-
tion of section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i) is also at issue in this case. On August 19,
1999, a U.S. magistrate judge recommended that all of plaintiffs' claims,
including the claim pertaining to repayment of other debt, be dismissed.
On September 20, 1999, the court accepted the recommendation and dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims.67 An appeal is pending.
B. HOME IMPROVEMENT LITIGATION
Questions have also arisen relating to the appropriate interpretation of
the Texas Constitution pertaining to the authorized lien on homesteads
for home improvement loans. For example, in a letter dated Decem-
ber 12, 1997 (Request 1048),68 Representative Kenny Marchant asked for
an Attorney General's opinion on the following five questions relating to
the changes:
Do the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (D) apply only
to contracts for work and material used to repair or renovate existing
improvements?
Is the only requirement for a lien on homestead for work and mate-
rial used in constructing new improvements that the contract be
made in writing?
Will the following be considered repair or renovation of existing im-
provements: new house siding, roof replacement, and new windows?
Will additional improvements to a homestead, such as a new swim-
ming pool or a new garage be considered "new improvements" for
purposes of this constitutional provision, if the improvements do not
replace similar existing improvements?
65. Id.
66. No. SA-98-CA-491 OG (W.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1999).
67. See id. In addition to the debt repayment issue, the plaintiffs also asserted that
their loan closed less than twelve days after they signed a written loan application in viola-
tion of TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(i). This claim was also dismissed.
68. A copy is available at <http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/requests/rql048.pdf>.
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Will a contract to build a new house be subject only to the require-
ment that it be "contracted for in writing?" 69
The Texas Attorney General, however, decided not to respond to the
request. Questions attendant to the construction of section 50(a)(5) are
raised in the suits discussed below.
1. Suits Alleging the Changes are Unconstitutional
In Rooms With A View, Inc. v. Private National Mortgage Association
(d/b/a Pennie Mae),70 the plaintiff brought suit for a lender's refusal to
fund a home improvement loan in which the contract for services was
signed at a title abstract company. Apparently, the lender refused to
fund the loan because the contract for installation had been signed at a
title abstract company, which the defendant contended did not meet the
definition of a "title company" for purposes of section 50(a)(5)(D).71
The plaintiff sought declaratory relief with respect to the following:
" the constitutionality of section 50(a)(5)(D) based upon the conten-
tion that the provision is unconstitutionally vague, in that persons
of reasonable intelligence can and do differ on what constitutes a
"title company" for purposes of execution of a home improvement
contract;
* the constitutionality of section 50(a)(5)(D) based upon the conten-
tion that the limitation of the place of signature of the contract for
home improvements violates the parties' rights to assemble, travel,
and of due process and equal protection under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
" the constitutionality of section 50(a)(5) based on the contention
that the ballot presented to the public in voting on adoption and
ratification of proposition 872 failed to inform voters of the
changes proposed by proposition 8 with respect to home improve-
ment contracts;
* the constitutionality of section 50 based on the contention the re-
quirements infringe upon and interfere with interstate commerce;
and
" the constitutionality and/or enforceability of section 50(a)(5)(C)
based on the contention that the twelve day waiting period is void
for vagueness.
69. Rep. Kenny Marchant, Request for Attorney General's Opinion 1048 (Dec. 12,
1997).
70. No. 98-09772 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County; Tex., Feb. 11, 1999).
71. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5)(D). Article 16 requires that "the contract for
the work and material is executed by the owner and the owner's spouse only at the office
of a third-party lender making an extension of credit for the work and material, an attor-
ney at law, or a title company." Id.
72. H.J.R. 31 amending the Texas Constitution was presented to the voters as proposi-
tion 8 on the November 4, 1997 ballot as follows: "THE AMENDMENT TO THE
TEXAS CONSTITUTION EXPANDING THE TYPES OF LIENS FOR HOME EQ-
UITY LOANS THAT A LENDER, WITH THE HOMEOWNER'S CONSENT, MAY
PLACE AGAINST A HOMESTEAD."
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The court granted the defendant's motion.73 The Austin Court of Ap-
peals has affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 74
2. New Construction Suit
Questions have arisen whether subsections 50(a)(5)(A)-(D) 75 apply to
new construction rather than only to contracts for work and material used
to repair or renovate existing improvements. One court has ruled on the
issue.
In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. William Spradlin,76 the defendant alleged
that the plaintiff's lien relating to new construction was invalid for the
failure to comply with sections 50(a)(5)(A)-(D). The plaintiff, a home
builder, contracted with the defendant to build a residence on land
owned by the defendant in Gonzales County, Texas. To secure the
purchase price for the construction of the residence, the plaintiff took a
lien upon the defendant's land. The defendant's attorney sent a letter
alleging that the plaintiff's lien was invalid for failure to comply with sec-
tions 50(a)(5)(A)-(D) and demanded the plaintiff release the lien. The
plaintiff instituted the suit to defend its lien. The court granted the mo-
tion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff and ordered the
following:
1. That the provisions and requirements of the Texas Constitution,
article 16, section 50(a)(5)(A) through (D) are applicable only to
a lien upon homestead property for the repair or renovation of
existing improvements and that said provisions or requirements of
said subsection (a)(5)(A) through (D) are inapplicable to a lien
upon homestead property for the construction of new improve-
ments; and
2. That the lien of Plaintiff Jim Walter Homes, Inc... is valid and
enforceable with respect to the one acre homestead property of
Defendant William L. Spradlin, more particularly described
therein.77
The Dallas court of appeals has affirmed the trail court's decision. 78
73. No. 98-09772 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Feb. 11, 1999) (Order Granting
Defendant's Counter Motion For Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment, April 1, 1999).
74. 7 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
75. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50(a)(5)(A)-(D).
76. No. DV-98-2895-6 (134th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Oct. 30, 1998).
77. Id.
78. 9 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. filed).
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